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Authoritarianism is a form of government characterized by strong central power and limited political freedoms. Under an authoritarian regime, individual freedoms are subordinate to the state, and there is no constitutional accountability. Authoritarian regimes can be autocratic, with power concentrated in one person, or can be a committee, with power shared among officials and government institutions.[1] The political scientist Juan Linz defined authoritarianism in an influential 1964 work as possessing four qualities:[2]

  1. Limited political pluralism, realized with constraints on the legislature, political parties, and interest groups;
  2. Political legitimacy based upon appeals to emotion, and identification of the regime as a necessary evil to combat "easily recognizable societal problems, such as underdevelopment, and insurgency";
  3. Minimal political mobilization and suppression of anti-regime activities;
  4. Ill-defined executive powers, often vague and shifting, which extends the power of the executive.[3]

Authoritarian government and states[]

Types[]

Linz distinguished new forms of authoritarianism from personalistic dictatorships and totalitarian states, taking Francoist Spain as an example. Unlike personalistic dictatorships, new forms of authoritarianism have institutionalized representation of a variety of actors (in Spain's case, including the military, the Catholic Church, Falange, monarchists, technocrats and others). Unlike totalitarian states, the regime relies on passive mass acceptance rather than popular support.[4] Some scholars also mention the emergence of a different type of regime - the hybrid regime - in the post-Cold War era.[5]

Several subtypes of authoritarian regimes have been identified by Linz and others.[6] Linz identified the two most basic subtypes as traditional authoritarian regimes and bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes:

  • Traditional authoritarian regimes are those "in which the ruling authority (generally a single person)" is maintained in power "through a combination of appeals to traditional legitimacy, patron-client ties and repression, which is carried out by an apparatus bound to the ruling authority through personal loyalties". An example is Ethiopia under Haile Selassie I.[6]
  • Bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes are those "governed by a coalition of military officers and technocrats who act pragmatically (rather than ideologically) within the limits of their bureaucratic mentality."[6] Mark J. Gasiorowski suggests that it is best to distinguish "simple military authoritarian regimes" from "bureaucratic authoritarian regimes" in which "a powerful group of technocrats uses the state apparatus to try to rationalize and develop the economy" such as South Korea under Park Chung-hee.[6]

Subtypes of authoritarian regime identified by Linz are: corporatist or organic-statistic, racial and ethnic "democracy" and post-totalitarian.[6]

  • Corporatist authoritarian regimes "are those in which corporatism institutions are used extensively by the state to coopt and demobilize powerful interest groups". This type has been studied most extensively in Latin America.[6]
  • Racial and ethnic "democracies" are those in which "certain racial or ethnic groups enjoy full democratic rights while others are largely or entirely denied those rights", such as in South Africa under apartheid.[6]
  • Post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes are those in which totalitarian institutions (such as the party, secret police and state-controlled mass media[7]) remain, but where "ideological orthodoxy has declined in favor of routinization, repression has declined, the state's top leadership is less personalized and more secure, and the level of mass mobilization has declined substantially".[6] Examples include the People's Republic of China, Russian Federation, and Soviet Eastern bloc states in the mid-1980s.[6]

Another type of authoritarian regime is the "competitive authoritarian" regime, a "civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents."[8] The term was coined by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way in their 2010 book of the same name to discuss a type of hybrid regime that emerged during and after the Cold War.[8][9] Competitive authoritarian regimes differ from fully authoritarian regimes in that elections are regularly held, the opposition can openly operate without a high risk of exile or imprisonment, and "democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power."[8] However, competitive authoritarian regimes lack one or more of the three characteristics of democracies: free elections (i.e., elections untainted by substantial fraud or voter intimidation); protection of civil liberties (i.e., the freedom of speech, press, and association), and an even playing field (in terms of access to resources, the media, and legal recourse).[10]

Authoritarian regimes are also sometimes subcategorized by whether they are personalistic or populist.[6] Personalistic authoritarian regimes are characterized by arbitrary rule and authority exercised "mainly through patronage networks and coercion rather than through institutions and formal rules".[6] Personalistic authoritarian regimes have been seen in post-colonial Africa. By contrast, populist authoritarian regimes "are mobilizational regimes in which a strong, charismatic, manipulative leader rules through a coalition involving key lower-class groups".[6] Examples include Argentina under Perón,[6] Egypt under Nasser[6] and Venezuela under Chávez and Maduro.[11][12]

Authoritarianism is characterized by highly concentrated and centralized power maintained by political repression and the exclusion of potential challengers. It uses political parties and mass organizations to mobilize people around the goals of the regime.[13] Adam Przeworski has theorized that "authoritarian equilibrium rests mainly on lies, fear and economic prosperity".[14]

Authoritarianism also tends to embrace the informal and unregulated exercise of political power, a leadership that is "self-appointed and even if elected cannot be displaced by citizens' free choice among competitors", the arbitrary deprivation of civil liberties and little tolerance for meaningful opposition.[13]

A range of social controls also attempt to stifle civil society, while political stability is maintained by control over and support of the armed forces, a bureaucracy staffed by the regime and creation of allegiance through various means of socialization and indoctrination.[13]

Authoritarian political systems may be weakened through "inadequate performance to demands of the people".[13] Vestal writes that the tendency to respond to challenges to authoritarianism through tighter control instead of adaptation is a significant weakness and that this overly rigid approach fails to "adapt to changes or to accommodate growing demands on the part of the populace or even groups within the system".[13] Because the legitimacy of the state is dependent on performance, authoritarian states that fail to adapt may collapse.[13]

Authoritarianism is marked by "indefinite political tenure" of the ruler or ruling party (often in a one-party state) or other authority.[13] The transition from an authoritarian system to a more democratic form of government is referred to as democratization.[13]

John Duckitt suggests a link between authoritarianism and collectivism, asserting that both stand in opposition to individualism.[15] Duckitt writes that both authoritarianism and collectivism submerge individual rights and goals to group goals, expectations and conformities.[16]

Authoritarianism and totalitarianism[]

Template:Revolution sidebar

Totalitarianism is an extreme version of authoritarianism. Authoritarianism primarily differs from totalitarianism in that social and economic institutions exist that are not under governmental control. Building on the work of Yale political scientist Juan Linz, Paul C. Sondrol of the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs has examined the characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian dictators and organized them in a chart:[17]

Totalitarianism Authoritarianism
Charisma High Low
Role conception Leader as function Leader as individual
Ends of power Public Private
Corruption Low High
Official ideology Yes No
Limited pluralism No Yes
Legitimacy Yes No

Sondrol argues that while both authoritarianism and totalitarianism are forms of autocracy, they differ in "key dichotomies": Template:Quote

Compared to totalitarianism, "the authoritarian state still maintains a certain distinction between state and society. It is only concerned with political power and as long as that is not contested it gives society a certain degree of liberty. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, invades private life and asphyxiates it".[18] Another distinction is that "authoritarianism is not animated by utopian ideals in the way totalitarianism is. It does not attempt to change the world and human nature".[18] Carl Joachim Friedrich writes that "a totalist ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police, and monopoly control of ... industrial mass society" are the three features of totalitarian regimes that distinguish them from other autocracies.[18]

Authoritarianism and democracy[]

Template:Communitarianism sidebar Authoritarianism and democracy are not fundamentally opposed to one another, as it is possible for democracies to possess authoritarian elements.[19] An illiberal democracy (or procedural democracy) is distinguished from liberal democracy (or substantive democracy) in that illiberal democracies lack features such as the rule of law, protections for minority groups and an independent judiciary.[20]

A further distinction that liberal democracies have rarely made war with one another; research has extended the theory and finds that more democratic countries tend to have few wars (sometimes called militarized interstate disputes) causing fewer battle deaths with one another and that democracies have far fewer civil wars.[21][22]

Some commentators, such as Seymour Martin Lipset, believed that low-income authoritarian regimes have certain technocratic "efficiency-enhancing advantages" over low-income democracies, helping authoritarian regimes generate development.[23] Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle and Michael M. Weinstein (2005) counter this belief, arguing that the evidence has shown that there is no "authoritarian advantage" and that there is a "democratic advantage" instead.[23] Halperin et al. argue that democracies "realize superior development performance" over authoritarianism. They point out that poor democracies are more likely to have steadier economic growth and less likely to experience economic and humanitarian catastrophes than authoritarian regimes; that civil liberties act as a curb on corruption and misuse of resources; and that democracies are more adaptable.[23] Halperin point out that the vast majority of refugee crises and financial catastrophes occur in authoritarian regimes.[23]

Studies suggest that several health indicators (life expectancy and infant and maternal mortality) have a stronger and more significant association with democracy than they have with GDP per capita, size of the public sector or income inequality.[24] Prominent economist Amartya Sen has theorized that no functioning liberal democracy has ever suffered a large-scale famine.[25]

Research shows that the democratic nations have much less democide or murder by government. Those were also moderately developed nations before applying liberal democratic policies.[26] Research by the World Bank suggests that political institutions are extremely important in determining the prevalence of corruption and that parliamentary systems, political stability and freedom of the press are all associated with lower corruption.[27] One study has concluded that terrorism is most common in nations with intermediate political freedom. The nations with the least amount of terrorism are the most and least democratic nations.[28]

Characteristics[]

Systemic weakness and resilience[]

Andrew J. Nathan notes that "regime theory holds that authoritarian systems are inherently fragile because of weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, overcentralization of decision making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms....Few authoritarian regimes—be they communist, fascist, corporatist, or personalist—have managed to conduct orderly, peaceful, timely, and stable successions".[29] One exception to this general trend is the endurance of the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party, which has been unusually resilient among authoritarian regimes. Nathan posits that this can be attributed to four factors: (1) "the increasingly norm-bound nature of its succession politics"; (2) "the increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the promotion of political elites"; (3) "the differentiation and functional specialization of institutions within the regime"; and (4) "the establishment of institutions for political participation and appeal that strengthen the CCP's legitimacy among the public at large".[29]

Gender and authoritarianism[]

According to a study by Brandt and Henry, there is a direct correlation between the rates of gender inequality and the levels of authoritarian ideas in the male and female populations. It was found that in countries with less gender equality where individualism was encouraged and men occupied the dominant societal roles, women were more likely to support traits such as obedience which would allow them to survive in an authoritarian environment and less likely to encourage ideas such as independence and imagination. In countries with higher levels of gender equality, men held less authoritarian views. It is theorized that this occurs due to the stigma attached to individuals who question the cultural norms set by the dominant individuals and establishments in an authoritarian society as a way to prevent the psychological stress caused by the active ostracizing of the stigmatized individuals.[30]

Examples[]

There is no precise definition of authoritarianism, but several annual measurements are attempted, including Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World report.

Current[]

The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of states which are currently (or frequently) characterized as authoritarian:

  • Template:Flag under the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola Party (1975–)[31]
  • Template:Flag under Heydar Aliyev (1993-2003) and Ilham Aliyev (2003–)[32]
  • Template:Flag under the House of Khalifa (1746–)[33]
  • Template:Flag under Alexander Lukashenko (1994–)[34][35] on account of Lukashenko's self-described authoritarian style of government[36][37][38]
  • Template:Flag / Template:Flag under Milorad Dodik (2006–)[39][40][41]
  • Template:Flag under Pierre Nkurunziza (2005–)[42]
  • Template:Flag under the Khmer Rouge and Hun Sen (1985–)[43]
  • Template:Flag under Paul Biya (1982–)[44][45]
  • Template:Flag under Idriss Deby (1990–)[46]
  • Template:Flag under the Communist Party of China (1949–) “Some scholars have deemed the Chinese system a 'fragmented authoritarianism' (Lieberthal), a 'negotiated state' or a 'consultative authoritarian regime'"[47] According to research by John Kennedy at al. (2018), Chinese citizens with higher education tend to participate less in local elections and have lower levels of democratic values when compared to those with only compulsory education.[48]
  • Template:Flag under Mobutu Sese Seko, Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila (1965–)[49]
  • Template:Flag under Denis Sassou Nguesso (1979–)[50]
  • Template:Flag under the Communist Party of Cuba (1959–)[51]
  • Template:Flag under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (2014–)[52]
  • Template:Flag under Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (1979–)[53]
  • Template:Flag under Isaias Afwerki (1993–)[54]
  • Template:Flag under Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (1991–)[55]
  • Template:Flag under Omar Bongo and Ali Bongo Ondimba (1967–)[56]
  • Template:Flag under Viktor Orbán (2010–) has recently moved more towards illiberalism[57][58][59]
  • Template:Flag under Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979)[60], and later Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei (1981–)[61] Linz wrote in 2000 that "it is difficult to fit the Iranian regime into the existing typology, as it combines the ideological bent of totalitarianism with the limited pluralism of authoritarianism and holds regular elections in which candidates advocating differing policies and incumbents are often defeated"[62]
  • Template:Flag under Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein[63]
  • Template:Flag under Nursultan Nazarbayev[44]
  • Template:Flag under the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (1975–)[64]
  • Template:Flag under Mohammed VI[63][65][66]
  • Template:Flag under Milo Đukanović and DPS (1990–)[67][68][69][70][71]
  • Template:Flag under the rule of the Kim dynasty and the Korean Workers' Party (1947–)[72]
  • Template:Flag under Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said[73]
  • Template:Flag under the Palestine Liberation Organization (1964-present) and Hamas (2007-present)[74]
  • Template:Flag under the House of Thani[75]
  • Template:Flag under Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev (1999–) (see Putinism for more) has authoritarian tendencies, and is described by some as "really a mixture of authoritarianism and managed democracy"[76][77][78]
  • Template:Flag under Paul Kagame (2000–)[79]
  • Template:Flag under the House of Saud (1744–)[80]
  • Template:Flag under Aleksandar Vučić (2012–)[81][82][83][84]
  • Template:Flag is considered authoritarian, especially under Lee Kuan Yew until 2015.[85][86]
  • Template:Flag under Salva Kiir Mayardit (2011–)[87]
  • Template:Flag under the Ba'athist regime and al-Assad family (1963–)[88]
  • Template:Flag under Emomali Rahmon (1994–)[89]
  • Template:Flag under General Prayut Chan-o-cha who overthrew the democratically elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra in a military coup and installed a military junta to oversee the governance of Thailand (2014–)[90]
  • Template:Flag under Recep Tayyip Erdogan (2003–) described as a “competitive authoritarian regime”[91]
  • Template:Flag under Saparmurat Niyazov (1991–2006) and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow (2006–)[92]
  • Template:Flag under the six royal families of the United Arab Emirates (10 February 1972–)[93][94]
  • Template:Flag since independence (1964–)[95]
  • Template:Flag under Islam Karimov (1989–2016)[96][97] and Shavkat Mirziyoyev (2016-)[98]
  • Template:Flag under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro (1999–)[99]
  • Template:Flag under the Vietnamese Communist Party (1976–)[100]

Historical[]

Examples of states which were historically authoritarian include

State Time period Ruling group or person Notes
Template:Flag[101] 1999-2019 Abdelaziz Bouteflika
Template:Flag[102][103] 1966–1973 Military government Argentine Revolution period of military rule
1973–1974 Justicialista rule of Juan Perón Ideology is populist authoritarianism
1976–1983 Free trade and deregulatory rule of Jorge Rafael Videla National Reorganization Process period of military rule
Template:Flagicon image Brazil[104] 1937–1945 Getúlio Vargas Estado Novo period
1964–1985 Military government
Template:Flagicon image Burma[105] 19622011 Military government and Socialist Programme Party
Template:Flag[106] 1973–1990 Augusto Pinochet
Template:Flag[107][108] 1990–1999 Franjo Tuđman
Template:Flag 1938–1939 Party of National Unity
Template:Flag[109] 1952–2011 Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak
Template:Flag 1967–1998 Suharto
Template:Flagicon imageLibya[110] 1969–2011 Muammar Gaddafi
Template:Flag[111] 1926–1940 Antanas Smetona
Template:Flag [112][113] 2006–2016 Nikola Gruevski
Template:Flag[114] 1926–1933 Military government National Dictatorship
1933–1974 António de Oliveira Salazar and Marcelo Caetano Under the Estado Novo regime
Template:Flagicon image Spain[115] 1936–1975 Francisco Franco
Template:Flagicon image South Africa[116][117] 1948–1994 National Party Regime ended with the end of apartheid
Template:Flag[118][119] 1948–1960 Syngman Rhee
1962–1987 Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan
Template:Flag[44] 1989–2019 Omar al-Bashir
Template:Flag[120] 1945–1990 Kuomintang
Template:Flag[121][122] 1925–1945 Republican People's Party
Template:Flag[123]Template:Sfn 1944–1980 Josip Broz Tito
Template:Flag[124][125] 1991–2000 Slobodan Milošević
Template:Flag[126] 1980–2017 Robert Mugabe

Historical trends[]

Anti-authoritarianism[]

Main article: Anti-authoritarianism

Both World War II (ending in 1945) and the Cold War (ending in 1991) resulted in the replacement of authoritarian regimes by either democratic regimes or regimes that were less authoritarian.

World War II saw the defeat of the Axis powers by the Allied powers. All the Axis powers — Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan — had totalitarian or authoritarian governments, and two of the three were replaced by governments based on democratic constitutions. The Allied powers were an alliance of Democratic states and (later) the Communist Soviet Union. At least in Western Europe the initial post-war era embraced pluralism and freedom of expression in areas that had been under control of authoritarian regimes. The memory of fascism and Nazism was denigrated. The new Federal Republic of Germany banned its expression. In reaction to the centralism of the Nazi state, for example, the new constitution of West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) exercised "separation of powers" and placed "law enforcement firmly in the hands" of the sixteen Länder or states of the republic, not with the federal German government (at least not at first).[127]

Culturally there was also a strong sense of anti-authoritarianism based on anti-fascism in Western Europe. This was attributed to the active resistance from occupation and to fears arising from the development of superpowers.[128] Anti-authoritarianism also became associated with countercultural and bohemian movements such as the Beat Generation in the 1950s,[129] the hippies in the 1960s[130] and punks in the 1970s.[131]

In South America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile and Uruguay moved away from dictatorships to democracy between 1982 and 1990.[132]

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991, the other authoritarian/totalitarian "half" of the Allied Powers of World War II collapsed. This led not so much to revolt against authority in general, but to the belief that authoritarian states (and state control of economies) were outdated. [133] The idea that "liberal democracy was the final form toward which all political striving was directed",[134] became very popular in Western countries and was celebrated in Francis Fukuyama's book The End of History and the Last Man.[134] According to Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., "all the new states that stumbled out of the ruins of the Soviet bloc, except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, seemed indeed to be moving toward democracy in the early 1990s," as where the countries of East Central Europe and the Balkans.[135]

In late 2010, the "Arab Spring" arose in response to unrest over economic stagnation but also in opposition to oppressive authoritarian regimes, first in Tunisia[136][137] and spreading to Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, and elsewhere. Regimes were toppled in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and partially in Yemen, and other countries saw riots, civil wars or insurgencies.[138]

Authoritarian revival[]

From 2005 to 2015 observers noted what some called a "democratic recession"[134][139] (although some — Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way — have disputed this theory).[139] In 2018 Freedom House declared that from 2006 to 2018, "113 countries" around the world showed "a net decline" in "political rights and civil liberties" while "only 62" experienced "a net improvement."[140]

Writing in 2018, U.S. political journalist David Frum stated:

The hopeful world of the very late 20th century—the world of NAFTA and an expanding NATO; of the World Wide Web 1.0 and liberal interventionism; of the global spread of democracy under leaders such as Václav Havel and Nelson Mandela—now looks battered and delusive."[141]

Michael Ignatieff wrote that Fukuyama's idea of liberalism vanquishing authoritarianism "now looks like a quaint artifact of a vanished unipolar moment",[134] and Fukuyama himself expressed concern.[133] By 2018 only one Arab Spring uprising — in Tunisia — resulted in a transition to constitutional democratic governance,[138] and a "resurgence of authoritarianism and Islamic extremism" in the region[142] was dubbed the "Arab Winter".[143][144][145][146][147]

Explanations offered for the new spread of authoritarianism by supporters include excessive immigration into European and Western countries, and the "primary and existential fear" of the "surrender" by liberal democracy of "national sovereignty and independence".[148] Others credit the downside of globalization,[149] and the success of the Beijing Consensus, i.e. the authoritarian model of the People's Republic of China.[150] In at least one country, (the U.S.) factors blamed for the growth of authoritarianism include the Financial crisis of 2007–2008 and slower real wage growth;[151] and social media's elimination of "gatekeepers" of knowledge, so that a large fraction of the population considers to be opinion what were once "viewed as verifiable facts” – everything from the danger of global warming to the preventing the spread of disease through vaccination.[152]

See also[]

  • Authoritarian capitalism
  • Anti-democratic thought
  • Autocracy
  • Centralisation
  • Illiberal democracy
  • Criticism of liberal democracy
  • Managed democracy
  • Totalitarianism

Notes[]

  1. Template:Cite book
  2. Richard Shorten, Modernism and Totalitarianism: Rethinking the Intellectual Sources of Nazism and Stalinism, 1945 to the Present (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 256 (note 67).
  3. Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule, pp. 40–50 (citing Linz 1964).
  4. Todd Landman, Studying Human Rights (Routledge, 2003), p. 71 (citing Linz 1964 and others).
  5. Template:Cite journal
  6. 6.00 6.01 6.02 6.03 6.04 6.05 6.06 6.07 6.08 6.09 6.10 6.11 6.12 6.13 Mark J. Gasiorowski, [[[:Template:Google books]] The Political Regimes Project], in On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants (ed. Alex Inketes), 2006, pp. 110–11.
  7. Template:Cite journal
  8. 8.0 8.1 8.2 Template:Cite book
  9. Template:Cite news
  10. Levitsky & Way (2010), pp. 7-12.
  11. Juan de Onis, "After Chavez, Authoritarianism Still Threatens Latin America", World Affairs (May 15, 2013): "the followers of the late President Hugo Chávez continue to apply the playbook of authoritarian populism throughout Latin America in their pursuit of more power...one of the Mercosur partners are challenging the basic political practices of authoritarian populism implanted in Venezuela."
  12. Kurt Weyland, "Latin America's Authoritarian Drift: The Threat from the Populist Left", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, Issue 3 (July 2013), pp. 18–32.
  13. 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 Theodore M. Vesta, [[[:Template:Google books]] Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War African State]. Greenwood, 1999, p. 17.
  14. Template:Cite book
  15. Template:Cite journal
  16. Template:Cite journal
  17. Template:Cite journal
  18. 18.0 18.1 18.2 Radu Cinpoes, Nationalism and Identity in Romania: A History of Extreme Politics from the Birth of the State to EU Accession, p. 70.
  19. Template:Cite journal
    • Thomas H. Henriksen, American Power after the Berlin Wall (Palgrave Macmillan: 2007), p. 199: "experts emphasize that elections alone, without the full democratic panoply of an independent judiciary, free press, and viable political parties, constitute, in reality, illiberal democracies, which still menace their neighbors and destabilize their regions."
    • David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 231: "Illiberal democracies may have reasonably free and fair national elections based on broad suffrage, but they do not counteract the tyranny of the majority with effective protections for ethnic and religious minorities or various types of dissenters."
    • Rod Hague & Martin Harrop, Political Science: A Comparative Introduction (7th ed.: Palgrave Macmillan: 2007), p. 259: "The gradual implementation of the rule of law and due process is an accomplishment of liberal politics, provide a basis for distinguishing liberal from illiberal democracies, and both from authoritarian regimes."
    • Vladimir Popov, "Circumstances versus Policy Choices: Why Has the Economic Performance of the Soviet Successor States Been So Poor" in After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Lessons of Transition (eds. Michael McFaul & Kathryn Stoner-Weiss: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 20: "The least efficient institutions are in illiberal democracies combining poor rule of law with democracy ... Less democratic regimes with weak rule of law ... appear to do better than illiberal democracies in maintaining institutional capacity."
  20. Template:Cite journal
  21. Template:Cite book
  22. 23.0 23.1 23.2 23.3 Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle, & Michael M. Weinstein, The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace (Council on Foreign Relations/Psychology Press, 2005).
  23. Template:Cite journal
  24. Template:Cite journal
  25. Template:Cite book
  26. Daniel Lederman, Norman Loayza, & Rodrigo Res Soares, "Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2708 (November 2001).
  27. Template:Cite web
  28. 29.0 29.1 Andrew J. Nathan, "Authoritarian Resilience", Journal of Democracy, 14.1 (2003), pp. 6–17.
  29. Template:Cite journal
  30. Template:Cite news
  31. Template:Cite news
  32. Nebil Husayn, Authoritarianism in Bahrain: Motives, Methods and Challenges, AMSS 41st Annual Conference (September 29, 2012); Parliamentary Elections and Authoritarian Rule in Bahrain (January 13, 2011), Stanford University
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  43. 44.0 44.1 44.2 Template:Cite book
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  46. Ming Xia, China Rises Companion: Political Governance, The New York Times. See also Cheng Li, The End of the CCP’s Resilient Authoritarianism? A Tripartite Assessment of Shifting Power in China (September 2012), The China Quarterly, Vol. 211; Perry Link and Joshua Kurlantzick, China's Modern Authoritarianism (May 25, 2009), The Wall Street Journal; Ariana Eunjung Cha, China, Cuba, Other Authoritarian Regimes Censor News From Iran (June 27, 2009), The Washington Post.
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  50. Ariana Eunjung Cha, China, Cuba, Other Authoritarian Regimes Censor News From Iran (June 27, 2009), The Washington Post; Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas, Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba and the Counterrevolution (July 16, 2001), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  51. Amr Adly, The Economics of Egypt’s Rising Authoritarian Order, Carnegie Middle East Center, June 18, 2014; Nathan J. Brown & Katie Bentivoglio, Egypt's Resurgent Authoritarianism: It's a Way of Life, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 9, 2014; Roula Khalaf, Sisi’s Egypt: The march of the security state, Financial Times (December 19, 2016); Peter Hessler, Egypt's Failed Revolution, New Yorker, January 2, 2017.
  52. Template:Cite news
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  54. Template:Cite news
  55. Template:Cite news
  56. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/05/hungary-and-poland-arent-democratic-theyre-authoritarian/
  57. https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/04/the-re-election-of-hungarys-authoritarian-prime-minister-disproves-everything-we-thought-we-knew-about-democracy.html
  58. Viktor Orbán Is Exploiting Anti-Semitism. Ira Forman, The Atlantic, 14 December 2018
  59. https://www.nytimes.com/1979/01/17/archives/years-of-autocratic-rule-by-the-shah-threw-iran-into-turbulence.html
  60. Mehrdad Kia, id=BaE3AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA75#v=onepage&q&f=false The Making of Modern Authoritarianism in Contemporary Iran, in Modern Middle East Authoritarianism: Roots, Ramifications, and Crisis (Routledge: 2013; eds. Noureddine Jebnoun, Mehrdad Kia & Mimi Kirk), pp. 75–76.
  61. Juan José Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 36.
  62. 63.0 63.1 Template:Cite news
  63. Beckert, Jen. "Communitarianism." International Encyclopedia of Economic Sociology. London: Routledge, 2006. 81.
  64. Template:Cite news
  65. Template:Cite news
  66. Template:Cite web
  67. Template:Cite web
  68. Template:Cite web
  69. Template:Cite web
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Works cited[]

  • Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain", in Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems (eds. Eric Allard & Yrjo Littunen) (Helsinki: Academic, 1964)

External links[]

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